[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.9] x86/VT-x: Don't activate VMCS Shadowing outside of nested vmx mode
commit 4f9a486899b643a3143a77a032f6c2069cb1e40a Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Fri Feb 1 12:04:03 2019 +0100 Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Fri Feb 1 12:04:03 2019 +0100 x86/VT-x: Don't activate VMCS Shadowing outside of nested vmx mode By default on capable hardware, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING is activated unilaterally. The VMCS Link pointer is initialised to ~0, but the VMREAD/VMWRITE bitmap pointers are not. This causes the 16bit IVT and Bios Data Area get interpreted as the read/write permission bitmap for guests which blindly execute VMREAD/VMWRITE instructions. This is not a security issue because the VMCS Link pointer being ~0 causes VMREAD/VMWRITE to complete with VMFailInvalid (rather than modifying a potential shadow VMCS), and the contents of MFN 0 has already been determined not to contain any interesting data because of L1TF's ability to read that 4k frame. Leave VMCS Shadowing disabled by default, and toggle it in nvmx_{set,clear}_vmcs_pointer(). This isn't the most efficient course of action, but it is the most simple way of leaving nested-virt working as it did before. While editing construct_vmcs(), collect all default secondary_exec_control modifications together. The disabling of PML is latently buggy because it happens after secondary_exec_control are written into the VMCS, although there is an unconditional update later which writes the correct value into hardware. Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master commit: 75ce36eb72cb93e8a3c9f60fd5e697067921d712 master date: 2018-12-10 16:24:08 +0000 --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 32 ++++++++++++++------------------ xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c index 49b86473b1..345bfbf6fc 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c @@ -1032,14 +1032,22 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control = vmx_secondary_exec_control; /* - * Disable descriptor table exiting: It's controlled by the VM event - * monitor requesting it. + * Disable features which we don't want active by default: + * - Descriptor table exiting only if wanted by introspection + * - x2APIC - default is xAPIC mode + * - VPID settings chosen at VMEntry time + * - VMCS Shadowing only when in nested VMX mode + * - PML only when logdirty is active + * - VMFUNC/#VE only if wanted by altp2m */ v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= - ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING; - - /* Disable VPID for now: we decide when to enable it on VMENTER. */ - v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID; + ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS | + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS); if ( paging_mode_hap(d) ) { @@ -1058,18 +1066,9 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) vmentry_ctl &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT; } - /* Disable Virtualize x2APIC mode by default. */ - v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= - ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE; - /* Do not enable Monitor Trap Flag unless start single step debug */ v->arch.hvm_vmx.exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG; - /* Disable VMFUNC and #VE for now: they may be enabled later by altp2m. */ - v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= - ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS | - SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS); - if ( !has_vlapic(d) ) { /* Disable virtual apics, TPR */ @@ -1153,9 +1152,6 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) __vmwrite(POSTED_INTR_NOTIFICATION_VECTOR, posted_intr_vector); } - /* Disable PML anyway here as it will only be enabled in log dirty mode */ - v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML; - /* Host data selectors. */ __vmwrite(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); __vmwrite(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __HYPERVISOR_DS); diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c index 20e7d4bf10..a3cce670d1 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c @@ -1124,6 +1124,10 @@ static void nvmx_set_vmcs_pointer(struct vcpu *v, struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs) __vmpclear(vvmcs_maddr); vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id |= VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK; + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control |= + SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING; + __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control); __vmwrite(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vvmcs_maddr); __vmwrite(VMREAD_BITMAP, page_to_maddr(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmread_bitmap)); __vmwrite(VMWRITE_BITMAP, page_to_maddr(v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmwrite_bitmap)); @@ -1135,6 +1139,10 @@ static void nvmx_clear_vmcs_pointer(struct vcpu *v, struct vmcs_struct *vvmcs) __vmpclear(vvmcs_maddr); vvmcs->vmcs_revision_id &= ~VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK; + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control &= + ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING; + __vmwrite(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, + v->arch.hvm_vmx.secondary_exec_control); __vmwrite(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, ~0ul); __vmwrite(VMREAD_BITMAP, 0); __vmwrite(VMWRITE_BITMAP, 0); -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.9 _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
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