[Xen-changelog] [xen master] SUPPORT.md: Add qemu-depriv section

[patchbot@xxxxxxx]

commit 2c224f4c518113c6f38d583b5b3b1da0fc92d022
Author:     George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Nov 6 15:41:22 2018 +0000
Commit:     George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Nov 6 15:41:22 2018 +0000

    SUPPORT.md: Add qemu-depriv section
    
    Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxx>
    Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
    ---
    Changes since v4:
    - Fix some grammar (s/attack/attacking/;)
    
    Changes since v3:
    - Moved from the qemu-depriv doc patches.
    - Reword to include the possibility of having a non-dom0 "devicemodel"
      domain which may want to be protected
    - Specify `Linux dom0` as the currently-tech-supported window
    
    CC: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
    CC: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
    CC: Konrad Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Julien Grall <julien.grall@xxxxxxx>
    CC: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>
    CC: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
 SUPPORT.md | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)

diff --git a/SUPPORT.md b/SUPPORT.md
index b398976f5c..42577d0243 100644
--- a/SUPPORT.md
+++ b/SUPPORT.md
@@ -526,6 +526,26 @@ Vulnerabilities of a device model stub domain
 to a hostile driver domain (either compromised or untrusted)
 are excluded from security support.
 
+### Device Model Deprivileging
+
+    Status, Linux dom0: Tech Preview, with limited support
+
+This means adding extra restrictions to a device model in order to
+prevent a compromised device model from attacking the rest of the
+domain it's running in (normally dom0).
+
+"Tech preview with limited support" means we will not issue XSAs for
+the _additional_ functionality provided by the feature; but we will
+issue XSAs in the event that enabling this feature opens up a security
+hole that would not be present without the feature disabled.
+
+For example, while this is classified as tech preview, a bug in libxl
+which failed to change the user ID of QEMU would not receive an XSA,
+since without this feature the user ID wouldn't be changed. But a
+change which made it possible for a compromised guest to read
+arbitrary files on the host filesystem without compromising QEMU would
+be issued an XSA, since that does weaken security.
+
 ### KCONFIG Expert
 
     Status: Experimental
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master

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