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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/spec_ctrl: Read MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES only once
commit d6c65187252a6c1810fd24c4d46f812840de8d3c
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Thu Apr 26 12:21:00 2018 +0100
Commit: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Wed May 16 12:19:10 2018 +0100
x86/spec_ctrl: Read MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES only once
Make it available from the beginning of init_speculation_mitigations(), and
pass it into appropriate functions. Fix an RSBA typo while moving the
affected comment.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c | 34 ++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
index 037e84dc13..4ab0f50106 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -97,18 +97,15 @@ static int __init parse_bti(const char *s)
}
custom_param("bti", parse_bti);
-static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
+static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps)
{
unsigned int _7d0 = 0, e8b = 0, tmp;
- uint64_t caps = 0;
/* Collect diagnostics about available mitigations. */
if ( boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level >= 7 )
cpuid_count(7, 0, &tmp, &tmp, &tmp, &_7d0);
if ( boot_cpu_data.extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008 )
cpuid(0x80000008, &tmp, &e8b, &tmp, &tmp);
- if ( _7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
- rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
printk(XENLOG_DEBUG "Speculative mitigation facilities:\n");
@@ -142,7 +139,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk)
}
/* Calculate whether Retpoline is known-safe on this CPU. */
-static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
+static bool __init retpoline_safe(uint64_t caps)
{
unsigned int ucode_rev = this_cpu(ucode_cpu_info).cpu_sig.rev;
@@ -153,19 +150,12 @@ static bool __init retpoline_safe(void)
boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6 )
return false;
- if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
- {
- uint64_t caps;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
-
- /*
- * RBSA may be set by a hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a
- * processor which isn't retpoline-safe.
- */
- if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA )
- return false;
- }
+ /*
+ * RSBA may be set by a hypervisor to indicate that we may move to a
+ * processor which isn't retpoline-safe.
+ */
+ if ( caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA )
+ return false;
switch ( boot_cpu_data.x86_model )
{
@@ -299,6 +289,10 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
{
enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT;
bool ibrs = false;
+ uint64_t caps = 0;
+
+ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPS) )
+ rdmsrl(MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, caps);
/*
* Has the user specified any custom BTI mitigations? If so, follow their
@@ -327,7 +321,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
* On Intel hardware, we'd like to use retpoline in preference to
* IBRS, but only if it is safe on this hardware.
*/
- else if ( retpoline_safe() )
+ else if ( retpoline_safe(caps) )
thunk = THUNK_RETPOLINE;
else if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) )
ibrs = true;
@@ -418,7 +412,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void)
else
setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NO_XPTI);
- print_details(thunk);
+ print_details(thunk, caps);
}
static void __init __maybe_unused build_assertions(void)
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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