|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen staging-4.6] x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD
commit 055abe41980b429eca9a899701f8327def937206
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri May 18 13:31:01 2018 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri May 18 13:31:01 2018 +0200
x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD
Experimentally, the behaviour of reserved bits in MSR_PRED_CMD changed
between
beta and production microcode, and now raises a #GP fault for set reserved
bits. The AMD spec for future hardware also specifies this behaviour, and
it
is the more sensible behaviour to implement.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
x86/msr: further correct the emulation behaviour of MSR_PRED_CMD
Following commit a6aa678fa3 ("x86/msr: Correct the emulation behaviour
of MSR_PRED_CMD") we may end up writing the low bit with the wrong
value. While it's unlikely for a guest to want to write zero there, we
should still permit (this without incurring the overhead of an actual
barrier). Correcting this right away will also help whenever further
bits in the MSR might become defined.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
master commit: a6aa678fa380e9369cc44701a181142322b3a4b0
master date: 2018-04-16 13:18:19 +0100
master commit: a996273d1fc10d14598985703227bfa35a91f681
master date: 2018-04-18 11:16:37 +0200
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 10 ++++------
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 10 ++++------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index ebabc10763..78f44c5f66 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -5007,12 +5007,10 @@ int hvm_msr_write_intercept(unsigned int msr, uint64_t
msr_content,
!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) )
goto gp_fault; /* MSR available? */
- /*
- * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In
- * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting.
- */
- if ( msr_content & PRED_CMD_IBPB )
- wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ if ( msr_content & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB )
+ goto gp_fault; /* Rsvd bit set? */
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, msr_content);
break;
case MSR_ARCH_CAPABILITIES:
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index eab5a3f23f..c23f4c0edb 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -2753,12 +2753,10 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct cpu_user_regs
*regs)
!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) )
goto fail; /* MSR available? */
- /*
- * The only defined behaviour is when writing PRED_CMD_IBPB. In
- * practice, real hardware accepts any value without faulting.
- */
- if ( eax & PRED_CMD_IBPB )
- wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ if ( msr_content & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB )
+ goto fail; /* Rsvd bit set? */
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, msr_content);
break;
case MSR_P6_PERFCTR(0)...MSR_P6_PERFCTR(7):
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#staging-4.6
_______________________________________________
Xen-changelog mailing list
Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.xenproject.org/xen-changelog
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |