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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/shadow: Avoid overflowing sh_ctxt->seg_reg[]
commit a9f3b3bad17d91e2067fc00d51b0302349570d08
Author: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Jul 1 01:02:04 2016 +0100
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Thu Sep 8 14:16:26 2016 +0200
x86/shadow: Avoid overflowing sh_ctxt->seg_reg[]
hvm_get_seg_reg() does not perform a range check on its input segment, calls
hvm_get_segment_register() and writes straight into sh_ctxt->seg_reg[].
x86_seg_none is outside the bounds of sh_ctxt->seg_reg[], and will hit a
BUG()
in {vmx,svm}_get_segment_register().
HVM guests running with shadow paging can end up performing a virtual to
linear translation with x86_seg_none. This is used for addresses which are
already linear. However, none of this is a legitimate pagetable update, so
fail the emulation in such a case.
This is XSA-187 / CVE-2016-7094.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c | 11 ++++++++++-
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
index 04ce322..7032869 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c
@@ -140,9 +140,18 @@ static int hvm_translate_linear_addr(
struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt,
unsigned long *paddr)
{
- struct segment_register *reg = hvm_get_seg_reg(seg, sh_ctxt);
+ const struct segment_register *reg;
int okay;
+ /*
+ * Can arrive here with non-user segments. However, no such cirucmstance
+ * is part of a legitimate pagetable update, so fail the emulation.
+ */
+ if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+
+ reg = hvm_get_seg_reg(seg, sh_ctxt);
+
okay = hvm_virtual_to_linear_addr(
seg, reg, offset, bytes, access_type, sh_ctxt->ctxt.addr_size, paddr);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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