[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [qemu-upstream-unstable] pcnet: force the buffer access to be in bounds during tx
commit 579e90432e995d6cb6f8520aca557fa6646f94ec Author: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@xxxxxxxxxx> AuthorDate: Sun May 24 10:53:44 2015 +0200 Commit: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> CommitDate: Wed Jun 10 11:40:43 2015 +0000 pcnet: force the buffer access to be in bounds during tx 4096 is the maximum length per TMD and it is also currently the size of the relay buffer pcnet driver uses for sending the packet data to QEMU for further processing. With packet spanning multiple TMDs it can happen that the overall packet size will be bigger than sizeof(buffer), which results in memory corruption. Fix this by only allowing to queue maximum sizeof(buffer) bytes. This is CVE-2015-3209. Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@xxxxxxxxxx> Reported-by: Matt Tait <matttait@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@xxxxxxxxxx> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@xxxxxxxxxx> --- hw/net/pcnet.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c index f409b92..f510932 100644 --- a/hw/net/pcnet.c +++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c @@ -1253,6 +1253,14 @@ static void pcnet_transmit(PCNetState *s) } bcnt = 4096 - GET_FIELD(tmd.length, TMDL, BCNT); + + /* if multi-tmd packet outsizes s->buffer then skip it silently. + Note: this is not what real hw does */ + if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer)) { + s->xmit_pos = -1; + goto txdone; + } + s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s, tmd.tbadr), s->buffer + s->xmit_pos, bcnt, CSR_BSWP(s)); s->xmit_pos += bcnt; -- generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/qemu-upstream-unstable.git _______________________________________________ Xen-changelog mailing list Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
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