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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/HVM: make hvm_efer_valid() honor guest features
commit e70c3da4d02790f9144e6b455f0d67b868c09557
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Fri Jan 23 15:13:05 2015 +0100
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Fri Jan 23 15:13:05 2015 +0100
x86/HVM: make hvm_efer_valid() honor guest features
Following the earlier similar change validating CR4 modifications.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 24f3333..2162f97 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -1683,20 +1683,64 @@ static int hvm_save_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
return 0;
}
-static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(struct domain *d,
- uint64_t value, uint64_t efer_validbits)
+static bool_t hvm_efer_valid(const struct vcpu *v, uint64_t value,
+ signed int cr0_pg)
{
- if ( nestedhvm_enabled(d) && cpu_has_svm )
- efer_validbits |= EFER_SVME;
+ unsigned int ext1_ecx = 0, ext1_edx = 0;
- return !((value & ~efer_validbits) ||
- ((sizeof(long) != 8) && (value & EFER_LME)) ||
- (!cpu_has_svm && (value & EFER_SVME)) ||
- (!cpu_has_nx && (value & EFER_NX)) ||
- (!cpu_has_syscall && (value & EFER_SCE)) ||
- (!cpu_has_lmsl && (value & EFER_LMSLE)) ||
- (!cpu_has_ffxsr && (value & EFER_FFXSE)) ||
- ((value & (EFER_LME|EFER_LMA)) == EFER_LMA));
+ if ( cr0_pg < 0 && !is_hardware_domain(v->domain) )
+ {
+ unsigned int level;
+
+ ASSERT(v == current);
+ hvm_cpuid(0x80000000, &level, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if ( level >= 0x80000001 )
+ {
+ unsigned int dummy;
+
+ level = 0x80000001;
+ hvm_funcs.cpuid_intercept(&level, &dummy, &ext1_ecx, &ext1_edx);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ext1_edx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_LM / 32];
+ ext1_ecx = boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[X86_FEATURE_SVM / 32];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Guests may want to set EFER.SCE and EFER.LME at the same time, so we
+ * can't make the check depend on only X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL (which on VMX
+ * will be clear without the guest having entered 64-bit mode).
+ */
+ if ( (value & EFER_SCE) &&
+ !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL)) &&
+ (cr0_pg >= 0 || !(value & EFER_LME)) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & (EFER_LME | EFER_LMA)) &&
+ !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_LM)) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & EFER_LMA) && (!(value & EFER_LME) || !cr0_pg) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & EFER_NX) && !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_NX)) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & EFER_SVME) &&
+ (!(ext1_ecx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SVM)) ||
+ !nestedhvm_enabled(v->domain)) )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & EFER_LMSLE) && !cpu_has_lmsl )
+ return 0;
+
+ if ( (value & EFER_FFXSE) &&
+ !(ext1_edx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_FFXSR)) )
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
}
/* These reserved bits in lower 32 remain 0 after any load of CR0 */
@@ -1774,7 +1818,6 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
struct vcpu *v;
struct hvm_hw_cpu ctxt;
struct segment_register seg;
- uint64_t efer_validbits;
/* Which vcpu is this? */
vcpuid = hvm_load_instance(h);
@@ -1805,9 +1848,7 @@ static int hvm_load_cpu_ctxt(struct domain *d,
hvm_domain_context_t *h)
return -EINVAL;
}
- efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_LMA
- | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
- if ( !hvm_efer_valid(d, ctxt.msr_efer, efer_validbits) )
+ if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, ctxt.msr_efer, MASK_EXTR(ctxt.cr0, X86_CR0_PG)) )
{
printk(XENLOG_G_ERR "HVM%d restore: bad EFER %#" PRIx64 "\n",
d->domain_id, ctxt.msr_efer);
@@ -2947,12 +2988,10 @@ err:
int hvm_set_efer(uint64_t value)
{
struct vcpu *v = current;
- uint64_t efer_validbits;
value &= ~EFER_LMA;
- efer_validbits = EFER_FFXSE | EFER_LMSLE | EFER_LME | EFER_NX | EFER_SCE;
- if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v->domain, value, efer_validbits) )
+ if ( !hvm_efer_valid(v, value, -1) )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Trying to set reserved bit in "
"EFER: %#"PRIx64"\n", value);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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