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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen master] x86/MSI: drop workaround for insecure Dom0 kernels
commit 061eebe0e99ad45c9c3b1a778b06140de4a91f25
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Apr 22 12:04:20 2014 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Apr 22 12:04:20 2014 +0200
x86/MSI: drop workaround for insecure Dom0 kernels
Considering that
- the workaround is expensive (iterating through the entire P2M space
of a domain),
- the planned elimination of the expensiveness (by propagating the type
change step by step to the individual P2M leaves) wouldn't address
the IOMMU side of things (as for it to obey to the changed
permissions the adjustments must be pushed down immediately through
the entire tree)
- the proper solution (PHYSDEVOP_msix_prepare) should by now be
implemented by all security conscious Dom0 kernels
remove the workaround, killing eventual guests that would be known to
become a security risk instead.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@xxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/msi.c | 40 +++++++++++++++-------------------------
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
index 76fb654..b0ab3ce 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c
@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ static void ept_change_entry_type_global(struct p2m_domain
*p2m,
return;
BUG_ON(p2m_is_grant(ot) || p2m_is_grant(nt));
- BUG_ON(ot != nt && (ot == p2m_mmio_direct || nt == p2m_mmio_direct));
+ BUG_ON(p2m_is_mmio(ot) || p2m_is_mmio(nt));
ept_change_entry_type_page(_mfn(ept_get_asr(ept)),
ept_get_wl(ept), ot, nt);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
index 61d6dd0..7dbb79d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -825,32 +825,22 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
msix->pba.last) )
WARN();
- if ( dev->domain )
- p2m_change_entry_type_global(dev->domain,
- p2m_mmio_direct, p2m_mmio_direct);
- if ( desc && (!dev->domain || !paging_mode_translate(dev->domain)) )
+ if ( desc )
{
- struct domain *d = dev->domain;
-
- if ( !d )
- for_each_domain(d)
- if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) &&
- (iomem_access_permitted(d, msix->table.first,
- msix->table.last) ||
- iomem_access_permitted(d, msix->pba.first,
- msix->pba.last)) )
- break;
- if ( d )
- {
- if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) && msix->warned != d->domain_id )
- {
- msix->warned = d->domain_id;
- printk(XENLOG_ERR
- "Potentially insecure use of MSI-X on
%04x:%02x:%02x.%u by Dom%d\n",
- seg, bus, slot, func, d->domain_id);
- }
- /* XXX How to deal with existing mappings? */
- }
+ struct domain *currd = current->domain;
+ struct domain *d = dev->domain ?: currd;
+
+ if ( !is_hardware_domain(currd) || d != currd )
+ printk("%s use of MSI-X on %04x:%02x:%02x.%u by Dom%d\n",
+ is_hardware_domain(currd)
+ ? XENLOG_WARNING "Potentially insecure"
+ : XENLOG_ERR "Insecure",
+ seg, bus, slot, func, d->domain_id);
+ if ( !is_hardware_domain(d) &&
+ /* Assume a domain without memory has no mappings yet. */
+ (!is_hardware_domain(currd) || d->tot_pages) )
+ domain_crash(d);
+ /* XXX How to deal with existing mappings? */
}
}
WARN_ON(msix->nr_entries != nr_entries);
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#master
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