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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen stable-4.1] x86/xsave: fix information leak on AMD CPUs
commit c3401c1aece47dc5388184c9b6a3527655d5bbdf
Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Tue Jun 4 09:38:49 2013 +0200
Commit: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Tue Jun 4 09:38:49 2013 +0200
x86/xsave: fix information leak on AMD CPUs
Just like for FXSAVE/FXRSTOR, XSAVE/XRSTOR also don't save/restore the
last instruction and operand pointers as well as the last opcode if
there's no pending unmasked exception (see CVE-2006-1056 and commit
9747:4d667a139318).
While the FXSR solution sits in the save path, I prefer to have this in
the restore path because there the handling is simpler (namely in the
context of the pending changes to properly save the selector values for
32-bit guest code).
Also this is using FFREE instead of EMMS, as it doesn't seem unlikely
that in the future we may see CPUs with x87 and SSE/AVX but no MMX
support. The goal here anyway is just to avoid an FPU stack overflow.
I would have preferred to use FFREEP instead of FFREE (freeing two
stack slots at once), but AMD doesn't document that instruction.
This is CVE-2013-2076 / XSA-52.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Tested-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@xxxxxxx>
master commit: 8dcf9f0113454f233089e8e5bb3970d891928410
master date: 2013-06-04 09:26:54 +0200
---
xen/arch/x86/i387.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
index 585b8c9..6e22eba 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/i387.c
@@ -44,6 +44,21 @@ static void xrstor(struct vcpu *v)
{
struct xsave_struct *ptr = v->arch.xsave_area;
+ /*
+ * AMD CPUs don't save/restore FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception
+ * is pending. Clear the x87 state here by setting it to fixed
+ * values. The hypervisor data segment can be sometimes 0 and
+ * sometimes new user value. Both should be ok. Use the FPU saved
+ * data block as a safe address because it should be in L1.
+ */
+ if ( (ptr->xsave_hdr.xstate_bv & XSTATE_FP) &&
+ !(ptr->fpu_sse.fsw & 0x0080) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD )
+ asm volatile ( "fnclex\n\t" /* clear exceptions */
+ "ffree %%st(7)\n\t" /* clear stack tag */
+ "fildl %0" /* load to clear state */
+ : : "m" (ptr->fpu_sse) );
+
asm volatile (
".byte " REX_PREFIX "0x0f,0xae,0x2f"
:
--
generated by git-patchbot for /home/xen/git/xen.git#stable-4.1
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