|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-changelog] [xen-4.2-testing] tmem: only allow tmem control operations from privileged domains
# HG changeset patch
# User Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
# Date 1348567759 -7200
# Node ID e0dc63c822b2825e84eee3b49cd05052cb0059d3
# Parent 3462914d95d32d5657de1fad8fd79547c696f081
tmem: only allow tmem control operations from privileged domains
This is part of XSA-15 / CVE-2012-3497.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@xxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
xen-unstable changeset: 25850:0dba5a888655
xen-unstable date: Tue Sep 11 12:06:30 UTC 2012
---
diff -r 3462914d95d3 -r e0dc63c822b2 xen/common/tmem.c
--- a/xen/common/tmem.c Wed Sep 19 17:33:05 2012 +0200
+++ b/xen/common/tmem.c Tue Sep 25 12:09:19 2012 +0200
@@ -2541,10 +2541,8 @@ static NOINLINE int do_tmem_control(stru
OID *oidp = (OID *)(&op->u.ctrl.oid[0]);
if (!tmh_current_is_privileged())
- {
- /* don't fail... mystery: sometimes dom0 fails here */
- /* return -EPERM; */
- }
+ return -EPERM;
+
switch(subop)
{
case TMEMC_THAW:
_______________________________________________
Xen-changelog mailing list
Xen-changelog@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xensource.com/xen-changelog
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |