[Xen-announce] Xen Security Advisory 285 v2 - race with pass-through device hotplug

[Xen.org security team <security@xxxxxxx>]

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                    Xen Security Advisory XSA-285
                              version 2

                 race with pass-through device hotplug

UPDATES IN VERSION 2
====================

Metadata updated to remove dependency on XSA-283.

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

When adding a passed-through PCI device to a domain after it was already
started, IOMMU page tables may need constructing on the fly.  For PV
guests the decision whether a page ought to have a mapping is based on
whether the page is writable, to prevent IOMMU access to things like
page tables.  Writablility of a page may, however, change at any time.
Failure of the relevant code to respect this possible race may lead
to IOMMU mappings of, in particular, page tables, allowing the guest
to alter such page tables without Xen auditing the changes.

IMPACT
======

Malicious PV guests can escalate their privilege to that of the
hypervisor.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All versions of Xen are vulnerable.

Only x86 systems are vulnerable.  ARM systems are not vulnerable.

Only x86 PV guests can exploit the vulnerability.  x86 HVM and PVH
guests cannot exploit the vulnerability.

Only guests which are assigned a device after domain creation can
exploit this vulnerability.  Guests which are not assigned devices, or
guests assigned devices at domain creation time, cannot exploit this
vulnerability.

MITIGATION
==========

Running only HVM or PVH guests avoids the vulnerability.

Assigning passed-through PCI devices to PV guests at domain creation
time also avoids the vulnerability.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Jan Beulich of SUSE.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

xsa285.patch           xen-unstable
xsa285-4.11.patch      Xen 4.7.x - Xen 4.11.x

$ sha256sum xsa285*
0851a4a9120220e2b03eafaf94648077154b6a6f27c29055d3779ccad7684fce  xsa285.meta
9e96d3763158edde8d664c3e26761e63ca6f96bb921e0d7eb68351fe47499bde  xsa285.patch
38ec20b04e0a859abe9850803ae00a33e48591a9949e5287dfa3725f3bd179f3  
xsa285-4.11.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.

(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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Attachment: xsa285.meta
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa285.patch
Description: Binary data

Attachment: xsa285-4.11.patch
Description: Binary data

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