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[Xen-announce] Xen Project Maintenance Releases Available (Versions 4.4.1, 4.3.3, 4.2.5)



I am pleased to announce the release of Xen 4.4.1, 4.3.3 and 4.2.5. We recommend that all users of the 4.4, 4.3 and 4.2 stable series update to the latest point release.

= Xen 4.4.1 =

Xen 4.4.1 is available immediately from its git repository http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.4
(tag RELEASE-4.4.1) or from the XenProject download pagehttp://www.xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/supported-xen-44-series/xen-441.html

This fixes the following critical vulnerabilities (also see http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/):

* CVE-2014-2599 / XSA-89: HVMOP_set_mem_access is not preemptible
* CVE-2014-3125 / XSA-91: Hardware timer context is not properly context switched on ARM
* CVE-2014-3124 / XSA-92: HVMOP_set_mem_type allows invalid P2M entries to be created
* CVE-2014-2915 / XSA-93: Hardware features unintentionally exposed to guests on ARM
* CVE-2014-2986 / XSA-94: ARM hypervisor crash on guest interrupt controller access
* CVE-2014-3714,CVE-2014-3715,CVE-2014-3716,CVE-2014-3717 / XSA-95: input handling vulnerabilities loading guest kernel on ARM
* CVE-2014-3967,CVE-2014-3968 / XSA-96: Vulnerabilities in HVM MSI injection
* CVE-2014-3969 / XSA-98: insufficient permissions checks accessing guest memory on ARM
* CVE-2014-4021 / XSA-100: Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests
* CVE-2014-4022 / XSA-101: information leak via gnttab_setup_table on ARM
* CVE-2014-5147 / XSA-102: Flaws in handling traps from 32-bit userspace on 64-bit ARM
* CVE-2014-5148 / XSA-103: Flaw in handling unknown system register access from 64-bit userspace on ARM

Additionally a workaround for CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59 (Intel VT-d Interrupt Remapping engines can be evaded by native NMI interrupts) has been put in place. However, at this point we can't guarantee that all affected chipsets are being covered; Intel is working diligently on providing us with a complete list.

Apart from those there are many further bug fixes and improvements.

= Xen 4.3.3 =

Xen 4.3.3 is available immediately from its git repository http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.3 (tag RELEASE-4.3.3) or from the XenProject download page http://www.xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/supported-xen-43-series/xen-433.html

This fixes the following critical vulnerabilities (also see http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/):

* CVE-2014-2599 / XSA-89: HVMOP_set_mem_access is not preemptible
* CVE-2014-3124 / XSA-92: HVMOP_set_mem_type allows invalid P2M entries to be created
* CVE-2014-3967,CVE-2014-3968 / XSA-96: Vulnerabilities in HVM MSI injection
* CVE-2014-4021 / XSA-100: Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests

Additionally a workaround for CVE-2013-3495 / XSA-59 (Intel VT-d Interrupt Remapping engines can be evaded by native NMI interrupts) has been put in place. However, at this point we can't guarantee that all affected chipsets are being covered; Intel is working diligently on providing us with a complete list.

Apart from those there are many further bug fixes and improvements.

= Xen 4.2.5 = 

Xen 4.2.5 is available immediately from its git repository http://xenbits.xen.org/gitweb/?p=xen.git;a=shortlog;h=refs/heads/stable-4.2
(tag RELEASE-4.2.5) or from the XenProject download pagehttp://www.xenproject.org/downloads/xen-archives/supported-xen-42-series/xen-425.html

Note that this is expected to be the last release of the 4.2 stable series. The tree will be switched to security only maintenance mode after this release.

This fixes the following critical vulnerabilities (also see http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/):

* CVE-2014-2599 / XSA-89: HVMOP_set_mem_access is not preemptible
* CVE-2014-3124 / XSA-92: HVMOP_set_mem_type allows invalid P2M entries to be created
* CVE-2014-3967,CVE-2014-3968 / XSA-96: Vulnerabilities in HVM MSI injection
* CVE-2014-4021 / XSA-100: Hypervisor heap contents leaked to guests

Apart from those there are many further bug fixes and improvements.
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