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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH][ACM] kernel enforcement of vbd policies via blkback driver
Harry Butterworth <harry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote on 07/27/2006 12:36:43 PM:
> On Thu, 2006-07-27 at 17:26 +0100, Harry Butterworth wrote:
> > untrusted driver domain <-> trusted encryption domain <-> FE-domain
> > hypervisor
> > trusted access control domain
> Another argument in favour of this kind of approach is that if your BE
> is something like a fibrechannel driver for a SAN, there isn't actually
> any security on the SAN side of it so any guarantees provided by the
> driver domain are pretty much worthless.
We are talking about scalable, secure, and efficient local device virtualization.
The argumentation for network devices is very different and also interesting. There is a whole new discussion about how to establish trust into remote parties.
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