> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 30 May 2006 08:52:48 -0400
> From: Michael LeMay <lemaymd@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [Xen-devel] ACM ternary ops?
> To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Message-ID: <447C4020.4020008@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
> Hello all,
>
> I am interested in adding support for user-defined mandatory network
> access control policies to the existing ACM policy framework. The most
> logical way to do this would be to add more hooks to handle networking
> and then define another policy module, like chinese wall and type
> enforcement. However, it doesn't feel right to add a "ternary_ops"
> structure that is invoked after "secondary_ops". Is there any
> reasonable justification for not including a link in each ops structure
> that points to the next policy module in the chain? Essentially, I'd
> like to convert the current n-pointer structure to the following
> linked-list structure:
>
> acm_primary_ops -> acm_secondary_ops -> acm_ternary_ops -> ... -> NULL
>
Hi Michael,
to be able to answer more (than I do below) to your point, I need to
know what "user-defined" policy do you aim to enforce? Is it a
finer-grained operating system policy (based on OS structures, such as
IP address or similar things etc.)?
If it is an operating system policy, then the policy should be
implemented, decided, enforced, and managed in the operating system
(e.g., IP tables, SELinux,...) and probably not in the hypervisor. The
major focus of the ACM hypervisor security module is to keep the
hypervisor code as small as possible and robust, and the hypervisor
security guarantees easy to understand. --> only integrate what needs
to be there. Higher layer security can and should be handled in the
higher layers (OS, Middleware, Apps.).
Regarding hypervisor ACM network enforcement: We are currently
integrating network packet policy enforcement into the Dom0 netback
interface to control local network traffic (enforcing the simple
type-enforcement policy based on acm labels of sending/receiving
domain). In this case, we don't need new policies but integrate the
existing acm_getdecision hypervisor call into the netback code to
decide if a packet is passed or discarded between virtual network
interfaces. This solutions appears to be a good fit for local traffic
because the virtual network resource is part of the hypervisor
environment and because the network policy is based on hypervisor
structures: domains (not IP...). Other enforcement is be needed to
guard external packets and such controls (at least our prototypes) use
OS-level security, such as SELinux.
>Is there any
> reasonable justification for not including a link in each ops structure
> that points to the next policy module in the chain?
Every policy layer operating on the same hooks might keep internal
state information, which must be rolled back if an access is denied by
a policy component called "later" for the same hook. The chinese wall
and the simple type enforcement policy components were chosen to build
a hypervisor policy because they complete each other (one controls
which domains can start on a system, the other controls how started
domains can share information/communicate) and because they offer a
good abstraction (workload = Doms + resources) based on which security
guarantees are understood.
Running more than two policy components at the same time would require
to show that you really need all these policies active at the same
time. Otherwise, it seems more appropriate to define a new hypervisor
policy that can be configured instead of the existing ones (assuming
this new policy belongs into the hypervisor layer).
Greetings
Reiner