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[Xense-devel] Re: [Xen-devel] ACM ternary ops?
Reiner,Thank you for that detailed explanation, it's great to hear that you'll be integrating additional networking hooks into ACM. Are they currently available in any public repositories? After this discussion, I've decided that the appropriate approach to my problem would be to add more networking hooks as well, although I haven't yet determined exactly where I will need them. I would hate to recreate your work or conflict with it.
Since you asked what exactly I'm looking for, I'll try to explain it briefly here. I'd like to have a general network access control architecture at the hypervisor level, that can control network communications to and from any domU. It shouldn't matter whether the communications are intended for other VMs on the same machine, or some external host. Originally, I had wanted to have some control over which IP addresses the domU's are permitted to communicate with. However, after this discussion, I can see that a better approach would be to restrict the communications from all VMs such that they are unable to make any connections, but simply route connections through a designated VM that enforces an appropriate network policy from userspace or using iptables, etc.
-- Michael Reiner Sailer wrote:
> ------------------------------ > > Message: 4 > Date: Tue, 30 May 2006 08:52:48 -0400 > From: Michael LeMay <lemaymd@xxxxxxxxxxx> > Subject: [Xen-devel] ACM ternary ops? > To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx > Message-ID: <447C4020.4020008@xxxxxxxxxxx> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed > > Hello all, > > I am interested in adding support for user-defined mandatory network > access control policies to the existing ACM policy framework. The most > logical way to do this would be to add more hooks to handle networking > and then define another policy module, like chinese wall and type > enforcement. However, it doesn't feel right to add a "ternary_ops" > structure that is invoked after "secondary_ops". Is there any > reasonable justification for not including a link in each ops structure > that points to the next policy module in the chain? Essentially, I'd > like to convert the current n-pointer structure to the following > linked-list structure: > > acm_primary_ops -> acm_secondary_ops -> acm_ternary_ops -> ... -> NULL > Hi Michael,to be able to answer more (than I do below) to your point, I need to know what "user-defined" policy do you aim to enforce? Is it a finer-grained operating system policy (based on OS structures, such as IP address or similar things etc.)?If it is an operating system policy, then the policy should be implemented, decided, enforced, and managed in the operating system (e.g., IP tables, SELinux,...) and probably not in the hypervisor. The major focus of the ACM hypervisor security module is to keep the hypervisor code as small as possible and robust, and the hypervisor security guarantees easy to understand. --> only integrate what needs to be there. Higher layer security can and should be handled in the higher layers (OS, Middleware, Apps.).Regarding hypervisor ACM network enforcement: We are currently integrating network packet policy enforcement into the Dom0 netback interface to control local network traffic (enforcing the simple type-enforcement policy based on acm labels of sending/receiving domain). In this case, we don't need new policies but integrate the existing acm_getdecision hypervisor call into the netback code to decide if a packet is passed or discarded between virtual network interfaces. This solutions appears to be a good fit for local traffic because the virtual network resource is part of the hypervisor environment and because the network policy is based on hypervisor structures: domains (not IP...). Other enforcement is be needed to guard external packets and such controls (at least our prototypes) use OS-level security, such as SELinux.>Is there any > reasonable justification for not including a link in each ops structure > that points to the next policy module in the chain?Every policy layer operating on the same hooks might keep internal state information, which must be rolled back if an access is denied by a policy component called "later" for the same hook. The chinese wall and the simple type enforcement policy components were chosen to build a hypervisor policy because they complete each other (one controls which domains can start on a system, the other controls how started domains can share information/communicate) and because they offer a good abstraction (workload = Doms + resources) based on which security guarantees are understood.Running more than two policy components at the same time would require to show that you really need all these policies active at the same time. Otherwise, it seems more appropriate to define a new hypervisor policy that can be configured instead of the existing ones (assuming this new policy belongs into the hypervisor layer).GreetingsReiner
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